IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY CIVIL DIVISION 3 NEIL J. GILLESPIE, 4 5 Plaintiff, Case No.: 05-7205 6 -vs-Division: F 7 BARKER, RODEMS & COOK, P.A. A Florida Corporation, WILLIAM J. COOK, 8 9 Defendants. 10 11 12 13 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 14 HONORABLE RICHARD A NIELSEN 15 BEFORE: Circuit Judge 16 TAKEN AT: Hearing Room No. 508 Hillsborough County Courthouse 17 Tampa, Florida 18 DATE & TIME: April 25, 2006 Commencing at 2:15 p.m. 19 Denise L. Bradley, RPR 20 REPORTED BY: Notary Public 21 22 23 **ORIGINA** 24 STENOGRAPHICALLY RECORDED 25 COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION

| 1  | APPEARANCES:   |
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| 3  | On behalf of the Plaintiff:                                  |
| 4  | NEIL J. GILLESPIE  |
| 5  | (Pro se litigant)  |
| 6  |  |
| 7  | On behalf of the Defendant:                                  |
| 8  | RYAN CHRISTOPHER RODEMS, ESQUIRE Barker, Rodems & Cook, P.A. |
| 9  | 400 North Ashley Drive, Suite 2100<br>Tampa, Florida 33602   |
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### PROCEEDINGS

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THE COURT: All right. So you are Mr. Gillespie, is that correct?

MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, Your Honor. Neil Gillespie.

THE COURT: And you are Mr. Rodems?

MR. RODEMS: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What order do we want to take these matters up today?

MR. RODEMS: Well, Judge, we noticed three motions for hearing, two of them filed by

Mr. Gillespie. The first was to disqualify me as counsel for the defendants. The second was to dismiss the defendant's -- dismiss and strike defendant's counterclaims. Our motion is a Section 57.105 motion.

The fourth motion that we filed had to do with a request for a bailiff to be present. We didn't notice that for hearing, but obviously we have a deputy here. So that I don't know that that necessarily needs to come up. It was not noticed for hearing today, but we can take it up if you want to.

I would suggest that the order that makes sense to follow is Mr. Gillespie's motion to disqualify and the motion to strike our counterclaims.

THE COURT: I agree. And as for the request for bailiff, my procedure is on any case in which there is

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a pro se party, a bailiff is present. So just for future reference you do not have to submit a request. And since it's not in the form of a motion, I don't think it needs a ruling. All right.

Motion to disqualify, Mr. Gillespie.

MR. GILLESPIE: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Gillespie, you can go ahead and argue your motion.

MR. GILLESPIE: Thank you, Judge. As the motion states, this is to disqualify Mr. Rodems and the law firm from representing themselves because in their position as both attorney, Mr. Cook and the law firm, they previously represented me. When the matter is the same or substantially similar to the matter in the present controversy, now the interest of Mr. Cook and Barker, Rodems & Cook are materially adverse to my interests, their former client. And this is creating a conflict of interest, a conflict of interest that applies to an attorney associated with a law firm.

THE COURT: Mr. Gillespie, I notice that you are reading your motion to disqualify, is that correct?

MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, it is.

THE COURT: All right. Just so that we can expedite this, I have read your motion.

MR. GILLESPIE: Okay.

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THE COURT: So if there's any additional argument 1 that you wish to make, clarifying, expanding, 2 presenting case law that would support that, that is 3 what I would ask you to do at this time. 4 MR. GILLESPIE: I thank you, Judge. No, I think 5 6 the motion is fairly thorough. THE COURT: Well see then there was one 7 clarification that I had, and you had actually just 8 9 read that portion of it. You made reference to a same 10 or substantially similar matter to the present 11 controversy. Have you previously -- well, are you referring to the matter in which, as I understand, some 12 of the underlying facts of your claim relate to the 13 action that you had retained the firm for having to do 14 with the --15 16 MR. GILLESPIE: Amscot Corporation. THE COURT: Yes, the Amscot. 17 MR. GILLESPIE: Yes. 18 19 THE COURT: And the action brought. Was it in federal court? 20 21. MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, it was, Judge. 22 THE COURT: Is that, when you refer to a matter 23 or a substantially similar matter, is that the matter you were referring to? 24 25 MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, Judge. The defendants

represented me on that case, which really, as you say, forms the underlying facts of this case. They also represented me on another payday loan lawsuit against Ace Cash Express, which was more or less contemporaneously handled with the Amscot case. So those two cases were similar. The Amscot case of course is more similar because the same facts are involved in contract and in how the case played out.

THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you.

Mr. Rodems.

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MR. RODEMS: Thank you, Judge. As you pointed out, Your Honor, Rule 4-1.9 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar discusses the same or substantially related matter. The matter that the defendants represented Mr. Gillespie on was a Truth in Lending Act claim filed in the federal court involving issues of --

THE COURT: Do you have that rule?

MR. RODEMS: Yes, sir. It's 4-1.9.

THE COURT: Four --

MR. RODEMS: 4-1.9.

THE COURT: All right. Got it.

MR. RODEMS: Okay. So the case that

Mr. Gillespie alleges is substantially the same or similar involved a claim by Mr. Gillespie against Amscot, a corporation, involving alleged violations of

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Mr. Gillespie's rights under the Truth in Lending Act.
This lawsuit involves different parties, different
facts and different legal issues.

In the case of Frank, Weinberg & Black vs.

Effman, 916 So.2d 971, there was also a motion to disqualify on that case. The defendant in that case was a law firm. And they were seeking to disqualify an attorney by the name of Atlas who was representing Effman. And Atlas had at one time represented the law firm in an action the firm brought against a departing shareholder to recover fees that that departing shareholder received from clients.

And what the court said in that case is, quote, the trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of law in ruling that the 1991 lawsuit, which involved the shareholder recovering fees from clients, were not substantially related to the 2003 lawsuit within the meaning of the rule, 4-1.9. The lawsuits involved entirely different facts, even though the same underlying document governing the relationship is the same.

So here we have a situation that is quite similar to that case in which Mr. Gillespie is now suing Barker, Rodems & Cook PA and Mr. Cook individually regarding a contract he entered into with the law firm.

And it's completely separate, independent of the action that the law firm represented Mr. Gillespie on.

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In addition to that case, Bochese vs. Town of

Ponce Inlet, 267 F. Supp. 2nd 1240, the court ruled in
that case that the, and again it was a challenge under
4-1.9. That the two cases, the one that the client was
claiming that was substantially the same involved
different plaintiffs, different defendants, and for the
large part, different legal issues, which again is what
we have here. The court in that case denied a motion
to disqualify counsel under 4-1.9.

In Jet One Center Inc., In Re: Jet One Center
Inc., 310 So.2d -- I'm sorry, 310-BR, Bankruptcy
Reporter, 649 -- this is Judge Paskay -- there was a
motion to disqualify the city of Naples airport
authority's attorney, who was Mr. Amado. The motion
was filed by the bank. Amado had, I think at the same
time or contemporaneously or in the past represented
the bank. But he represented the bank on collection
cases and this involved bankruptcy.

And the court said even a cursory reading of the text in sub clause (a) -- again referring to 4-1.9 -- this rule leaves no doubt that it applies only to a representation of a client against a former client in matters that are, quote, the same or a substantially

related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interest of the former client.

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And then Judge Paskay went on to say, one would be hard pressed indeed to set forth a persuasive argument that Amado's representation of the bank in collection cases before the small claims court or in other cases where he appeared for the bank are, quote, the same or substantially related matters, closed quote, to the interest of the former client.

It would involve a quantum leap indeed to tie the issues involved in those cases to the complex and highly technical issue involved in this litigation with NAA, dealing with regulations of the FAA programs at airports and such. And again, Your Honor, that case also suggests that where you've got different parties, different facts, different legal issues, that 4-1.9 doesn't come into play.

And I would also cite the court to the case of Transmark USA vs. State Department of Insurance, which is at 631 So.2d 1112-1116. And that case talks about these types of motions, Your Honor. And what it says is that, you know, when you wait a considerable length of time and then try to move to disqualify counsel, it takes on the appearance of being suspicious or having a

calculated or strategic reason for doing that.

In this case this motion was filed six or eight months after this litigation began. And it appears to be nothing more than an effort by Mr. Gillespie to either delay proceedings or disrupt Barker, Rodems & Cook PA and Mr. Cook from having the counsel of their choosing, which the case law also says that's a drastic remedy that should only be allowed under unusual circumstances.

Now he also raises some other issues about why I should be disqualified. And he says in his motion that I'm going to be a witness in this case. Well, the case law on that is clear. That allegation alone is not enough. You got to prove it. He has not established in any way before this court with any testimony how I'm a witness.

But more importantly, in the case of *Cerillo vs.*Highley, 797 So.2d 1288, the court says, a lawyer may act as an advocate at pretrial, open parens, before the start of the trial, closed parens, and post-trial, open parens, after the judgment is rendered, closed parens.

So even if, even if I was to be a witness in this case, which there's been no proof of that, that wouldn't prevent me from handling the pretrial matters or the post-trial matters, just the actual trial of the

case.

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But I would also point you out to Singer Island

Limited vs. Budget Construction Company because that

one is almost directly on point. 714 So.2d 651.

And what the court said is, you know, where somebody is moving to disqualify counsel on the basis that they're going a witness, quote, we view motions to disqualify on this ground with some skepticism because they are sometimes filed for tactical or harassing reasons rather than the proper reasons.

And in that case on a writ of certiorari, the court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to disqualify because the petitioner alleged at most only a possibility that disqualification might be necessary. In that case he said the attorney was going to be a witness, but he hadn't taken the attorney's deposition, as Mr. Gillespie has not taken my deposition.

And it said, quote, if petitioner had waited until after he had deposed opposing counsel, he might have been able to develop more of a record to support his motion to disqualify. On the other hand, counsel's testimony might well have convinced petitioner that a motion to disqualify would not have been well-founded.

So here he comes in with a bold, unfounded allegation that somehow or other I'm going to be a

witness in the case and therefore I should be disqualified. His final reason for trying to disqualify me is he said that I lack candor, which he cites no case law to that. And I would assert before the Court, as an officer of the court, that everything that I've represented to the court has been accurate.

So his, again, unsupported, unfounded allegation under the law cannot support a disqualification. So we would ask you to deny that motion, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any further response, Mr. Gillespie?

MR. GILLESPIE: Yes. I would respond as to what

Mr. Rodems would testify to. That would be his

performance during the settlement of this matter where

he was having me sign documents in his law office that

the -- that there have been -- November 1st, 2001. And

then two days earlier at the settlement where we signed

Amscot documents. He would be testifying about what he

did at that time. And that's a pretty substantial part

of this case.

The contract really is a central issue in this case. In fact I've just filed today a motion for summary judgment, and this is Mr. Rodems copy.

Mr. Rodems, that's your copy.

There's also an affidavit in support. And this is a contract case with elements of fraud. The

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contract is the same contract in the Amscot case, and it's the same contract in this case. And now it's up for summary judgment. Now if that's granted, this may be a moot point.

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However, if it goes further I'll have to take his, as you know, a deposition and get to exactly what his role was in the settlement in creating these false documents. The documents that say on the one hand that we had a court award for attorney's fees, and on the other hand, it wasn't really a court award. It was a claim to a court award. And it was a claim that had no, nothing to back it up. And all of that is argued in the summary, in the motion for summary judgment.

As far as lack of candor towards the court, he's made several references to the fact that I committed criminal extortion. He cited Florida Statute 836.05 and the holdings of the four cases in here. And there's really no basis for that. And on that basis alone, I think he should be disqualified.

THE COURT: All right. Well, with respect to those matters covered under the conflict of interest, your motion is denied.

As to the issue of a witness, it is also denied. It is without prejudice to raise it at a later time if appropriate. I will say that my understanding of the

rules relating to attorney as witness is that those rules have over the years substantially changed from a position where 15 years ago any even possibility of an attorney being a witness would have resulted in disqualification.

Rightly or wrongly, the Florida Bar, as well as the American Bar Association has moved to a position where the issue of an attorney being a witness is not an automatic basis for disqualification.

And in fact I think there's some case law.

There's cases out there that suggest that an attorney can handle the case, Mr. Rodems, you were saying pre and post-trial and not at trial. But my recollection is, and there's some cases out there that say you can even handle it at trial handing over the matter to co-counsel at the point that you might have to testify. At that point you would actually be testifying, a hypothetical I'm suggesting. But having said all of that, it's denied without prejudice for you to raise that at some later time.

As for the grounds based upon lack of candor, I don't find a proper basis for that at this time. The allegations that you have made with respect to allegations Mr. Rodems may have made seems to me to fall within the litigation privilege. And so that is

denied as well.

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MR. GILLESPIE: Thank you, Judge. I don't think we discussed whether we were going to hear my motion for an order of protection. I trust you're in receipt of that.

THE COURT: I don't know about that one. I've read several motions. Yes, I did see that.

MR. GILLESPIE: That goes into the candor issue a little more thoroughly.

MR. RODEMS: Just a second, Your Honor. If I could have a moment to find that particular motion.

MR. GILLESPIE: It's plaintiff's verified response to defendant's verified request for bailiff and for sanctions, and plaintiff's motion for an order of protection. They're both contained in the same document.

MR. RODEMS: Your Honor, if I might suggest. The motion related to the motion to dismiss our counterclaim was -- we noticed these hearings first, and since we only have 45 minutes, I would suggest that it would be appropriate if we could go to the substantive motion.

THE COURT: Well, I agree. Mr. Gillespie, since your motion was quite late in the process, an add-on, if you will, to the response to the motion or the

request for the bailiff, I'll defer on that and go back to the order we were discussing.

So the disqualification is denied.

And then --

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MR. RODEMS: Your Honor, may I prepare the proposed order on that since I'm --

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. RODEMS: Okay.

THE COURT: Now so we're back to what, your motion for sanctions?

MR. RODEMS: No, sir. The next motion would be Mr. Gillespie's motion to dismiss and strike the defendant's counterclaim.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. GILLESPIE: Here's case law on that. Under the rule of civil procedure, defendant's counterclaim is a compulsory counterclaim and was not timely filed, was waived and must be dismissed. That is the first, the first objection to the counterclaim.

As defined by Rule 11 -- 1.170(a) compulsory counterclaim is one that arises out of a transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of opposing party's claim. It does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over which the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.

And that's what we have here. There are no third parties required in this lawsuit to adjudicate this claim. And the court has developed a test to determine whether a claim is compulsory, and that's the logical relationships test.

THE COURT: Mr. Gillespie, could you focus on the timing issue. I may come back to the issue of whether it's compulsory or permissive.

MR. GILLESPIE: Well basically I'm arguing that the -- a compulsory counterclaim must be raised at the first appearance, defendant's first appearance. And that would have been when he filed the defendant's motion to dismiss and strike on August 29th, 2005.

Now we're here today many months later. The case is far moved along. In fact there's a motion for summary judgment. And now defendants want to raise this claim, counterclaim that they should have done back on August 29th.

Your Honor, that's the timing issue.

THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Gillespie,
you're not trained in the law. You're not trained in
the Rules of Civil Procedure so I'll give you a quick
explanation of how we can get to where we are today.
When you filed your complaint, under the Rules of Civil
Procedure a defendant has the right, doesn't have to,

but has the right to file a motion to dismiss, that is question the legal sufficiency of certain pleadings.

That is not technically under the rules a responsive pleadings. It is testing the sufficiency of the complaint. Once the court rules on those preliminary motions and enters an order then directing a responsive pleading -- and that was done by order of January 13, '06. Let's see where I said it.

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Paragraph 2 is where I said that the motion to dismiss was denied. And stated further, defendant shall have 15 days from the date of this order within which to file responsive pleadings. And the key word is "responsive pleadings."

MR. GILLESPIE: Thank you, Judge, for making that clear. I understand that.

THE COURT: All right. So once that order is forthcoming, the parties have the opportunity to then file an answer, defenses, counterclaims, whether they are permissive or compulsory. And so under that understanding of the rules, sir, this was timely filed.

MR. GILLESPIE: Thank you, Judge. As for the jurisdiction allegation, I was relying on Mr. Rodems' answer. And his answer, on the one hand he claims in his counterclaim that I'm a resident of Marion County, but in his answer he denies that. In the complaint,

paragraph 1, Plaintiff Neil J. Gillespie resides in Ocala, Marion County, Florida. And defendant's response to it was, as to paragraph 1 of the complaint, defendants are without knowledge and therefore deny the allegations.

Now we go to their counterclaim, and they take the opposite position. And that will be 62, paragraph 62, page 6, counterclaims. On information and belief plaintiff counter defendant is a resident of Ocala, Marion County, Florida. And it was really a procedural objection. I don't know they can take both ends of that argument.

THE COURT: They can do that because they're lawyers.

MR. GILLESPIE: Okay.

THE COURT: And because the rules allow it.

MR. GILLESPIE: Okay.

THE COURT: And let me very briefly explain the difference. What they have said, and they're permitted to do this under the rules, is they don't know whether you are or not. So when you don't know, it's denied, again under the rules. When they come to their counterclaim and say on information and belief, again they're saying we don't know, but we think this guy lives in Marion County. And so everything they've done

does not establish or raise to the level of a lack of jurisdiction.

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In fact, you know, you started this party here in Hillsborough County. And so as a result of you starting the party, they can bring you here, because you came here, for anything they want, and under the law prove that they have some sort of cause of action. I'm not saying they do. I'm just saying that, again under our rules by you starting it here, they then don't have to go to your county to engage you in litigation.

MR. GILLESPIE: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: So I'll deny paragraph 2. All right.

Now in 3 you say they failed to state a cause of action for libel.

MR. GILLESPIE: Yes, Judge. In their complaint, in their counter complaint they attach a copy of the purported libel. In other words, it's not a complete, it's not a complete document. And in the letter to Amscot, and I have that as Exhibit 2. If you look at the letter to Amscot, the third paragraph it would be, and then the fourth sentence down in parentheses it says, see copy of my letter enclosed.

Well, the defendants haven't enclosed or attached that letter as part of this document. And in doing so

they are not presenting the entire item that they say is libelous. And the law is pretty clear on that, that you can't parse, pick words out and say this is libel and that's libel. You have to take the document in its full context. They haven't done that because they haven't attached the letter. But in contrast, they've attached a different letter, the one that they prepared, which really doesn't have bearing on my libel because I didn't write it.

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And I think that this should be, at least if not dismissed completely, at least dismissed with allowing them a chance to amend it so that we can see what the letter that "see copy of my letter enclosed" states.

Because right now we don't know. And it's important.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rodems, response on that.

MR. RODEMS: Thank you, Your Honor. First of all, under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the case law concerning motions to dismiss, all the allegations of the complaint are to be accepted as true. And this letter from Mr. Gillespie accuses the defendants and Barker, Rodems & Cook of, among other things, being incompetent and not truthful.

And Mr. Gillespie claims he was pressured into the lawsuit and that Amscot paid 42,000 too much to

settle the case. And that Mr. Cook said Mr. Gillespie was selfish for not suing Amscot. And that Amscot's and plaintiff counter defendant's attorneys engaged in collusion. Those are all things that are stated in this letter.

This is the letter that we received. The fact that the letter says, see copy of the letter enclosed, does not objectively prove that there was any letter enclosed. This is what we received.

The statements contained in this letter, regardless of whatever letter may have been attached, are defamatory. Some of them are defamatory in and of themselves, calling somebody untruthful, that type of thing. Saying that people engaged in collusion to force a higher settlement than plaintiff and counter defendant wanted.

So as far as the claim that Mr. Gillespie makes in his argument to dismiss, he's violating the provision of the case law that says you accept the claims in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, which would be us, and accepting them as true.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Rodems, are you saying with respect to Exhibit 2 that that's all that you, that that's all that the defendant received?

MR. RODEMS: That is all that the defendant

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received. Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is that set out in the -- let's see,
65 I guess talks about Exhibit 2.

MR. RODEMS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: It really doesn't clarify what you got as I read it.

MR. RODEMS: No, sir. And I don't believe that the pleading rules require us to do that. We are alleging that he composed and published this letter. And Mr. Gillespie can deny that allegation if he doesn't believe it's true. But at this point he composed and published that letter. It is a fact that we must assume on a motion to dismiss is true.

He's claiming that this isn't a complete letter, but again, he's making an assertion outside the four corners of the complaint to support his motion to dismiss, which is not appropriate on a motion to dismiss.

MR. GILLESPIE: Actually we're staying within the four corners of the letter. And it says, see copy of my letter enclosed. We have independent knowledge that Mr. Macatchney of Amscot did in fact receive the enclosed letter because I received the response from him by and through his attorney. And his attorney makes reference to the information in that letter.

Mr. Rodems I know has received a copy of that letter from another avenue.

THE COURT: All right. Well, here is how I'll rule. I will deny this paragraph 3 of your motion. But there will be included in this a statement in the order itself that the defendants represented at the hearing that the Exhibit 2 that they received consisted of only one page.

MR. GILLESPIE: All right. Judge, I'm not finished stating why and that I'll sustain a cause of action for libel. That's just the opener.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. GILLESPIE: There's an absolute privilege here concerning litigation. If you look at the letter, the letter begins with a caption of the court case. And that's Clemment et al., vs. Amscot Corporation with the case number, district court, et cetera. And it's addressed to Amscot Corporation, which was the defendant in that case. I'm not even sure that the letter rises to the level of publication because it was sent to the corporation that was a defendant in the lawsuit.

And that's what the letter talks about, the lawsuit. And as such, it talks about the lawsuit that was passed, the Amscot lawsuit. And let's just go

through it for a minute. It says, I was a plaintiff in the above-captioned lawsuit. While the action is settled, I regret becoming involved and was pressured into it by my lawyer.

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I don't know that that being pressured by a lawyer amounts to libel. I think that's what lawyers generally do is they pressure people. There may be a fancier term for it, but that's what they do.

Also it's a letter of apology to Mr. Macatchney.

I am sorry for the consequences you're suffering. And
then I go on to tell him the facts about this case,
that I found discrepancies in the case file. This is
part of my attempt to uncover the truth.

As I see it, you paid \$43,000 too much to settle this case, and here's why. Now Mr. Rodems objects to that, but this doesn't libel either Mr. Cook or Mr. Rodems' law firm because this doesn't talk about that. This talks about Mr. Macatchney. This is a question did he pay too much, and is more of a reflection on his attorney, not the defendants. It's just not about them.

For something to be libelous it has to concern the plaintiff, the counter claimant here. And none of these statements concern them, and if they do, they're privileged. And then it goes on to talk about

involvement in the Ace case, and that I initially declined Mr. Cook's solicitation to join the lawsuit.

And again, that's saying what I did. I initially declined. He solicited it. That's his job. I declined that.

And again, Mr. Cook said that I was selfish for not suing Amscot. Again that's Mr. Cook making a statement about me. I'm not claiming that they defamed me for saying that I'm selfish, and they have no basis under the law to claim they have been defamed by that.

apparent to me that Mr. Cook and his associates were incompetent and not truthful. And I think that that's been spelled out in the complaint from the lawsuit that's against them. And this is where the letter that's missing, and I have a copy of it here. During the settlement negotiations, I tried to settle this case for \$10,000 in legal fees and \$1,000 for each of the three plaintiffs. See copy of my letter enclosed.

Since they haven't provided it, let me provide it at this time.

THE COURT: Well, sir, that's not necessary.

MR. GILLESPIE: Not necessary? Thank you, Judge.

Again, you ultimately paid 56,000 to settle and
this was a result of our lawyers' collusion. Then I go

on to say, this is my opinion. This isn't put out as fact. This is my opinion. I was involved in a lawsuit and I'm -- I was preparing to sue them on the same set of facts, and this is my opinion of what happened.

And I also say, and I welcome any supporting evidence. I'm reaching out to this defendant who I've apologized to.

And I just want to go back to the second paragraph. I don't say that there was no cause of action against Amscot. I just say that it was a pretty thin case. And a thin case nevertheless is still a case that can be prosecuted.

And I go on to say, in the alternative, if that set of facts isn't correct, in the alternative, perhaps your lawyer was just a very poor negotiator and you paid \$43,000 too much to settle the lawsuit. I'm speculating. This is opinion and speculation. I'm trying to get at the truth here.

Finally I talk about a bar complaint against

Mr. Cook, that I filed a bar complaint, and then I put
the complaint number here. And I also write that this
was to no avail. That means that the bar reviewed all
of these issues here and more, and they decided that
whatever happened, that this didn't amount to anything
wrong under the Florida rules governing lawyers.

And then I go on to say, I'm available to discuss this further if you wish.

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THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Gillespie, let me again explain that whether it's in a counterclaim or complaint, I'm limited to looking at the four corners, just for sufficiency now, not the merits, the sufficiency under the law of what's alleged.

They allege that you have made false statements, that you've damaged their good name and reputation. I read the letter. That's within the four corners. The letter says the lawyers were incompetent and not truthful. That alone, not — there may be other things that if you've covered all of the points of your letter, it may or may not have been an issue to the defendants in this case. I don't know. But that alone in my mind rises to the level of a sufficient claim of libel.

Your second point, which was -- or my second point, it may have been your first point, is that you claim these are privileged communications relating to ongoing litigation. That may or may not be the case. Under libel, whether you are privileged in your communication or not is what is called an affirmative defense. So you must respond to the allegation of

1 whether it was libelous or not in your opinion. And if 2 you believe that they're privileged, then you raise 3 that as a defense. 4 MR. GILLESPIE: And would that go the same for a 5 qualified privilege? 6 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 7 MR. GILLESPIE: And what about the issue of not 8 being published? 9 THE COURT: Well, sir, my understanding of the law is if you say something or if you write something 10 and it goes to somebody else, that's publication. And 11 12 they say that you're the author of this, and it went to 13 somebody besides them. There have to be three parties involved. It has to be from one party to a third party 14 about a second party. That's sufficient to have 15 16 publication as I view this letter. 17 MR. GILLESPIE: All right. And whether it's 18 opinion, Judge? THE COURT: Again, that's going to be a matter of 19 20 defense. 21 MR. GILLESPIE: And with regard to their 22 incompetency, and the record shows that they did not 23 prevail in any court. THE COURT: Well, sir, truth will be your 24 25 absolute defense to libel.

1 MR. GILLESPIE: Will I need to assert that at 2 this time? 3 THE COURT: No, sir. 4 MR. GILLESPIE: Okay. 5 THE COURT: If you can prove to a trier of fact, 6 whether that's me or a jury, that in fact they were 7 incompetent, then the libel claim fails. 8 MR. GILLESPIE: All right. 9 THE COURT: All right. And we have run out of time. I have a 3:00. You have a 3:00 ending to your 10 11 45 minutes. So we can pick this up at some other time. MR. RODEMS: There are -- before we close the 12 record, Your Honor, just so that we're clear. There 13 14 are several more paragraphs of this motion to dismiss 15 and strike counterclaim that have not been heard. When 16 we readjourn are we going to pick it up from that point? 17 18 THE COURT: Well, it's up to you where you want 19 to pick it up. I've drawn my line after paragraph 3. 20 MR. RODEMS: Yes, sir. 21 THE COURT: Of the plaintiff's motion. 22 MR. GILLESPIE: Judge, I'm not clear about what's 2.3 happening. Could you help me understand. 24 THE COURT: We have stopped the hearing because 25 you have run out of time.

MR. GILLESPIE: Is that stop for the day or just for a break? THE COURT: It's stopped for the day. MR. GILLESPIE: Thank you. THE COURT: I have other cases that have scheduled from 3:00 through 4:30. So to pick up again you have to see my judicial assistant about additional time at some future date. MR. GILLESPIE: Thank you. Do I need to take any action other than that? 

THE COURT: Mr. Rodems will be preparing an order on what we've covered thus far, and he will send it to you for your review. Your review is only for the form, not whether you like the ruling or not, but the form of the order. But if the form meets with what you believe happened today, then you can approve that. And Mr. Rodems will send that on to me with that understanding.

If you disagree, then you're to provide your own version of what you believe the order, the rulings that may be covered.

MR. GILLESPIE: One of the things Mr. Rodems wanted to do was to challenge my qualifications to proceed pro se. Do you want to address any of that at this time?

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1
                THE COURT: We have no time left today.
 2
                MR. GILLESPIE:
                                 Okay.
 3
                MR. RODEMS: Thank you for your time, Your Honor.
                THE COURT: Thank you both.
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                 (Thereupon, the hearing concluded.)
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STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF HILLSBOROUGH

I, DENISE L. BRADLEY, court reporter for the circuit court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida, in and for Hillsborough County,

DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I was authorized to and did, through use of computer-aided transcription, report in shorthand the proceedings and evidence in the afore-styled cause, as stated in the caption thereto, and that the foregoing pages numbered 1 to 32, inclusive, constitute a true and correct transcription of my shorthand report of said proceedings and evidence.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand in the City of Tampa, County of Hillsborough, State of Florida, this 6th day of July, 2006.

Denise L. Bradley, Court Reporter

Deuse L. Brac

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